From Cyprus Mail, Here

Despite his aversion -even hatred- for arrogant imperial aristocrats, Hitler largely adopted their understanding of how the international system was developing. He observed, with alarm, that while Germany was still reeling under the pressure of Versailles, the rest of Europe was also in decay. As the “peripheral” superpowers (USSR and US) continued to rise, Europe was gradually relegated from being the key player to being the key playing field.

Even imperialist expansion, which Germany largely shunned, could no longer counterbalance the immense productive capacity of the new superpowers, nor handle the supremacy of the dollar under the continued monetary problems, not only of Germany but also of France and the UK.   

He could see that the only hope for Europe to hold center stage in this new reality, was for Germany to “unite” the continent, take control of Mitteleuropa, and let the British hold “the seas” and their Empire. He knew that such an “understanding” with the British would lend prospect to Germany, while allowing the British to maintain their imperial status. This would not only equalize the Balance of Power, but also allow national socialism to produce more, better and larger, on the back of a still successful economic model and a strong reichsmark.  

Hence his initial bemusement with Churchill’s attitude towards him. Sure, Chamberlain had been more spooked than he is given credit for. He even started rearming, especially the RAF, as soon as he returned triumphantly, from Munich where he sold out the Czechs in favor of a short-lived “peace for our time”. But this overweight drunk that emerged to replace him, was impossible to reason with.

A war with the UK would make things harder for Germany and, irrespectively of the outcome, had a series of predictable repercussions – the end of the Empire for the British and further empowerment of the peripheral superpowers.

Churchill, however, may have been a relative failure until he became PM, but he was astute in his understanding of Hitler. Yes, the war would mean an end to the Empire and a shift of power to the US and USSR, ending the long European Century.  But Churchill knew this and even seemed to be comforted by the prospect. He both predicted and pursued the life-after-death of the Special Relationship. Speaking of a process by which the British Empire and the US would become “somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs”, he likened that process to the Mississippi: “Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.”

But even more importantly, Churchill also diagnosed the most profound point that men like Halifax missed:

Beyond the realities of the proud but humiliated and wretched Germany that Keynes described, the main problem was the ideology and the personality of Hitler himself.

Nazism would make an unacceptable partner because of two core characteristics: First, it was a dynamic ideology -and necessarily so. Its dynamism was central to its own perpetuation. If it settled, it would act like a spinning toy losing speed. This meant that it had a visceral tendency to run through its options and escalate to extremes.

Secondly, partly because of its dynamism, Nazism was insatiable. As an emotional rather than a reasoned ideology, it was doomed to remain hungry, oppositional, and hence aggressive. Its Kriegsgeist was neither English-styled jingoism nor the sort of confined, calculated aggression of Bismarck’s militarism that is so reminiscent today of NATO’s various wars. It was fundamental, not a mantle.

It was these characteristics that nourished the sheer evil of Nazism, making it what Churchill rightly called “a monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime.”

The outcome was clear in Treblinka – and in the very rail tracks over which refugees cross today as they flee Ukraine. The sarcasm with which History now reverses the flow of refugees 80 years later, making Poland a waystation rather than a final destination, is the stuff of awe.

And, this is the deeper political economy of the war in Ukraine, despite the growing rift between Putin and the Russian people – a rift that Hitler did not have to face until late in his own war.

Beyond the sanctions, beyond the Crimean reserves and the pipelines, even beyond the oligarch investments, it is clear in Putin’s eyes that the balance of power is shifting. Europe is in a slow but steady decline; the US is reeling under years of inadequate infrastructure spending, an unrealistic debt and unprecedented division; and still China, for all its economic distortions, its hidden debt and its exposure to the dollar, is rising; India insists on keeping itself in the race, despite looking stuck in an “emerging superpower” status. Where would Russia stand in the new world architecture of power? How could she leverage wealth, technology, the generalised aversion towards liberal economics and the extremes in wealth distribution?

Of course, Moscow is rightly concerned by the expansion of NATO in the very area that Clemenceau dubbed “Cordon Sanitaire” after Locarno. But the ultimate question is simple as much as it is compelling:

What is the endgame? When does this end, where, and at what cost?

This is the simple but obligatory question by which we should measure our stance towards the war in Ukraine.

The main argument of Russian apologists has been that NATO often acts “like cowboys” and has “also” done unjustified violence excused by spurious if not fabricated information.  This is true, but “He did it, too, ma’am” is not an argument fitting for grown adults.  More importantly, this argument misses the single most important question of the nature, satiability, and ultimate intentions of Putin’s thinking. If “the Americans” exploited 9-11 to wage unjustified and morally reprehensible war in Iraq, for example (which I believe they did), this is as irrelevant to the war in Ukraine, as is the temperature on the moon. 

Beyond missile strikes and the victims, differences do exist and they are material: Putin needs to maintain his dynamism, to appeal to irredentist myths and to escalate as the easier options become exhausted. He absolutely must do this, just to retain the initiative and to remain in control of developments. He has even spearheaded Russian expansionism in other areas- ecclesiastical affairs and foreign elections- as well, notably across the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean.

And, precisely because Putin wants to, needs to, and is capable of, maintaining this necessary dynamism, the attack on Ukraine is much more dangerous and indeed more sinister than the examples so often cited in comparison.

This is perhaps the only true historical parallel between Hitler and Putin. But it is inescapable. The invasion in Ukraine has already revived a hitherto increasingly irrelevant NATO and seems to have generated a new historical push for EU integration, both in security and in fiscal affairs. But ultimately, the true conclusion it leads to is that the only scenarios that are bearable entail a response to Russian expansionism which is both severe and persistent, even after the fall of Kiev. By everyone.

Many thanks to C. Adamides for his feedback.